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In the early hours of 8 December 1962, the North Kalimantan National Army (TNKU) 
mounted a coup in the sultanate of Brunei.  The TNKU was the military arm of the 
People’s Party of Brunei led by the charismatic A.M. Azahari.  Its forces overran the 
oilfields at Seria and much of Brunei Town (Bandar Seri Begawan) to move through the 
rest of this tiny British protectorate and into the neighbouring colony of Sarawak. Despite 
a wealth of intelligence indicating an imminent uprising, the British had been caught off-
guard. As Lord Selkirk (Britain’s commissioner-general in the region) informed Harold 
Macmillan, ‘the revolution came within an inch of being completely successful’.  The 
rebels, however, lacked leadership, organisation and military experience and, once the 
Gurkhas and Royal Marines had arrived and General Walter Walker had assumed 
command, unrest was easily subdued and dissidents swiftly rounded up. 
Forty-five years later questions are still being asked about the causes, conduct and 
consequences of the rising, about its significance for the subsequent development of the 
sultanate and its wider, regional repercussions.  Was its target what Selkirk called ‘the 
decadent remnants of a feudal society’, or the neo-colonialism of Brunei-Shell, or the 
scheme to bundle Brunei (along with the rest of British Borneo) into the Anglo-Malayan 
‘grand design’ of Malaysia?  Did the rebels hope to topple the sultan or place him at the 
head of a popular movement?  Did they aspire to modernise Brunei or to restore its 
 2 
ancient glories? There is debate, too, about the amount of popular support which the 
TNKU enjoyed in Brunei and the degree of assistance it received from Indonesian 
irredentists or communists in Singapore and Sarawak.  As for the principals, some have 
suggested that the sultan himself was implicated in the rising.  Others have cast doubt on 
whether Azahari, who was in Manila at the time of the insurrection, can have been its 
effective strategist.  And in the shadows of the controversy have lingered the British 
security services, blamed at the time for their ‘supineness on the ground’ but since 
accused of dirty tricks. 
Much of the uncertainty surrounding the episode stems from a dearth of 
information on the Brunei side.  Nevertheless, an account of revolt and reaction together 
with a plausible interpretation of the central yet enigmatic role played by His Highness  
may be constructed from documents at The National Archives, Kew.  It is indisputable 
that, for all his prevarication, Sultan Omar was steadfast in the defence of the royal 
ascendancy. His decision not to parley with TNKU emissaries sealed the rebels’ fate and 
ensured that his regime would emerge from the disturbances more haughty than ever. 
Indeed, the British were disappointed in their hope that the revolt would frighten Omar  
into democratising his government and seeking safety for his kingdom in the new 
federation of Malaysia.  Their relief at the sultan’s survival was soon replaced by 
exasperation over the costs and criticism which they now incurred by assuming 
responsibility for what seemed to be the indefinite protection of a discredited autocrat.   
This latest account of the Brunei rebellion was researched by Harun Abdul Majid 
while at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.  He himself was a child 
growing up in Bandar Seri Begawan during the events about which he writes and he has 
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supplemented British archives with the memories of his family as well as interviews with 
participants and their sympathisers on both sides. This in itself is a remarkable 
achievement since for many years the revolt remained too sensitive to be discussed 
openly by Bruneians. These testimonies are certainly of interest but the book as a whole 
falls short of being the comprehensive history advertised by the publisher.  The text is 
short, occasionally repetitive, lightly annotated and neglectful of some recent, relevant 
publications.  While he judiciously draws a distinction between the rebellion itself 
(which, he writes, lies ‘somewhere near the bottom of one of the lower divisions’ in any 
league table of rebellions) and its wider consequences, his treatment of these wider 
consequences is under done.  As regards the Malaysian dimension, the claim that the 
‘main impetus’ came from Malaya’s Tunku Abdul Rahman under-estimates Lee Kuan 
Yew’s drive, while the analysis of Sultan Omar’s involvement in the negotiations adds 
little to existing accounts.  Furthermore, although attention is drawn to the ‘controversial’ 
influence of Brunei-Shell on British policy-making, exploration of this issue stops a long 
way short of either substantiating or refuting a link between oil and imperialism.  
Discussion of the possible connections between the revolt and the origins of Indonesian 
Confrontation is similarly inconclusive and veers off into a tribute to General Walker, the 
Gerald Templer of Borneo.   
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